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The sustained failure of efforts to design an infinite lottery machine using 
ordinary probabilistic randomizers is traced back to a problem familiar to set 
theorists: we have no constructive prescriptions for probabilistically non-
measurable sets. Yet construction of such sets is required if we are to be able to 
read the result of an infinite lottery machine that is built from ordinary 
probabilistic randomizers. All such designs face a dilemma: they can provide an 
accessible (readable) result with probability zero; or an inaccessible result with 
probability greater than zero. 
1.	Introduction	
 Norton (2018) and Norton and Pruss (2018a) explored the physical possibility of 
designing an infinite lottery machine.2 Such a machine would choose without favor among a 
countable infinity of outcomes 1, 2, 3, … A curious anomaly appeared in these explorations. It 
proved possible to find successful designs using plausible custom physics, such as the quantum 
                                                
1 My thanks to Alexander R. Pruss, Geoffrey Hellman and James R. Brown for helpful 
discussion. 
2 Why should philosophers of science be concerned with such machines? De Finetti (1972, 
§5.17) uses the chances they induce to justify the transition from countably additive probability 
measures to finitely additive measures in his subjective Bayesianism.  Norton (manuscript) uses 
them to motivate a variant, non-additive logic of induction. 
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randomizer of Norton (2018, §10). However all efforts to devise a machine using familiar 
probabilistic randomizers failed. The proposals reported in Norton (2018), corrected by Norton 
and Pruss (2018), were just a representative sample of many tried. Success could not be secured 
even allowing for quite exotic processes. The best designs that employed familiar probabilistic 
randomizers operated successfully only with probability zero. The recalcitrant nature of the 
failure raised the possibility that the obstacle was not merely a lack of imagination in design. 
Rather its recalcitrance suggested that the failure results from some matter of principle. 
 The goal of this note is to demonstrate that this is so. In any design, the probabilistic 
randomizers provide us with a probability space large enough to host the countable infinity of 
outcomes of the infinite lottery machine that encode “1”, “2” and so on. These infinite lottery 
outcomes must, in a general sense, be equal chance outcomes. If that equality of chances is 
expressed as an equality of probabilities, then these probabilities must each be zero valued. By 
countable additivity, it follows that successful operation, that is, the realization of any one of 
them, is a zero probability event. The escape that allows a non-zero probability of success is to 
employ probabilistically nonmeasurable outcome sets for the infinite lottery machine. 
 The failure of the design is now assured by a well-known problem in set theory. If they 
are required, probabilistically nonmeasurable sets must be assumed to exist, without being 
displayed constructively. All known examples of nonmeasurable sets are non-constructible in the 
sense that an explicit definition cannot be provided for them. There is no complete demonstration 
that this non-constructibility holds universally. There are missing pieces. One is the need to 
assume the existence of certain exotic cardinal numbers, whose existence is increasingly 
accepted in the literature. This non-constructibility of known examples has remained unbreached 
for nearly a century and there is little expectation that this will change. That it reflects a 
principled impossibility will be assumed below.  
 This non-constructibility leads to a problem for infinite lottery machines, derived from 
probabilistic randomizers. To know that the end state resulting from the operation of the machine 
lies in an outcome set encoding “1” or “2” or so on, we need to be able to specify which are these 
sets. But if the outcome sets are nonmeasurable, we cannot do it. A fatal tension ensues is the 
form of a dilemma for probabilistic, infinite lottery machines: these machines cannot both 
provide a result we can read and also operate successfully. That is: 
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• If such an infinite lottery machine employs measurable outcome sets, then they are sets of 
probability zero and the machine operates successfully only with zero probability. 
• If an infinite lottery machine employs nonmeasurable outcome sets, then these outcomes 
cannot be defined explicitly and the result drawn by the infinite lottery machine is not 
accessible. 
It is a cruel twist, reminiscent of “Catch-22.” A design can provide a result that we can read, only 
if the machine operates successfully with probability zero. 
 The following section will present a motivating example that illustrates the 
incompatibility of success and accessibility. Sections 3, 4 and 5 develop a more general 
characterization of infinite lottery machines based on probabilistic randomizers. It will be 
sufficient to establish the general incompatibility of success and accessibility. Section 6 presents 
another illustration of the failure in a different design. Section 7 states conclusions. The analysis 
only impugns infinite lottery machines derived from probabilistic randomizers. It leaves 
untouched the possibilities of other designs. The conclusion presents an illustration of a quantum 
mechanical infinite lottery machine. An appendix provides supporting material for the 
characterization of Section 4. 
 In other work (Norton, 2018, §5; manuscript), the chance properties of an infinite lottery 
are required to conform with a strong invariance condition, “label independence.” The analysis 
here does not impose this strong invariance condition. It relies only on the weaker requirement 
that each individual lottery outcome “1,” “2,” “3,”… has the same chance. 
2.	An	Illustration:	A	Spin	of	a	Pointer	on	a	Dial		
2.1	A	Design	with	Probability	Zero	of	Successful	Operation	
 The main ideas to be developed here appear in the following illustration of a 
 candidate infinite lottery machine, described in Norton (2018, §2.3). It consists of a pointer spun 
on a dial, such that the pointer will come to rest with a uniform probability distribution over all 
angles from 0 to 360o. If the pointer halts on a rational angle, then it can be used as an infinite 
lottery machine. For there are only countably many rational angles and they can be mapped one-
one to the natural numbers. The difficulty, however, is that the probability of selecting any 
particular rational angle r out of the infinity of possible angles, rational or real, is zero: 
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P(r) = 0                                                                          (1) 
Since there is only a countable infinity of rational angles r, the probability that any rational angle 
at all is selected is the sum of a countable infinity of zeros, which is zero. 
P(success) = P(r) = 0
0≤r<1
∑                                                          (2) 
The pointer will almost always select an irrational angle. That is, the randomizer will operate 
successfully only with probability zero. For all practical purposes, it does not function. 
2.2	The	Extended	Design:	Improving	the	Probability	of	Success	
 The difficulty would seem to be easily solved. We take the infinite lottery outcome sets, 
that is, those sets of randomizer outcomes to which the lottery outcomes 1, 2, 3, … are 
associated. We enlarge or extend them to include irrational angles. To each rational angle r, we 
attach some suitable set of irrational angles extend(r), such that the sets extend(r) partition the set 
of all angles. Then each spin of the pointer must halt in one of these sets extend(r). The 
associated rational r is then read off as the result of the infinite lottery machine. This extended 
design will always succeed, for every angle must belong to just one of the infinite lottery 
outcome sets, extend(r). 
 A concern is that we cannot assign any definite probability to each outcome set, 
extend(r). For if we assign zero probability to each set, then the probability of successful 
operation is zero, as (1) and (2) show. We would now also contradict the normalization of the 
probability distribution to unity. If we assign a probability greater than zero, say ε > 0, no matter 
how small: 
P(extend(r)) = ε > 0                                                                        (3) 
then the sum of only finitely many of these probabilities will exceed one, in contradiction with 
the normalization of the probability distribution to unity. Choose any natural number N  > 1/ε. 
Summing over N infinite lottery outcomes yields 
P(extend(r)) > ε .(1 / ε ) = 1
N
∑                                                            (4) 
We are caught in a dilemma: 
Probability assignment dilemma: the probability of each infinite lottery outcome is 
either zero or non-zero. In both cases, if the outcome sets partition the outcome 
space, the normalization to unity of the probability distribution is contradicted. 
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 What follows will provide an escape from dilemma. 
2.3	Extension	by	Vitali	Sets	
 A simple scheme for this extension is provided by the Vitali sets. To implement the 
scheme, we take the angles from 0 to 360o and rescale them to 0 to 1.3 We partition the set of 
angles into equivalence classes, such that two angles belong to the same equivalence class just if 
they differ by a rational angle. That is, angles x and y are in the same equivalence class, just if y 
= x ⊕ r, where r is a rational angle. (Addition “⊕” is modulus 1 addition, so all angles x, y 
remain constrained as 0 ≤ x,y < 1.) Writing “[x]” for the equivalence class that contains x, we can 
give the formal definition: 
[x] = {y | there is a rational r such that y = x ⊕ r} 
All the rational angles form one such equivalence class, [0]. Irrational angles form other 
equivalence classes such as [1/e] and [1/√2]. 
 A Vitali set is formed as the set assembled from the following selections: 
Choice: select just one angle from each of these equivalence classes [x]. 
Just how this selection is made will prove to be the essential point, to which we will return 
shortly. Call Vit(0) a Vitali set formed under some selection that contains the rational angle 0. 
We can generate another Vitali set from this first Vitali set merely by adding a rational angle r, 
modulo 1, for some 0 ≤ r < 1, to each element of Vit(0). Call this new set Vit(r). Each real angle r 
in  0 ≤ r < 1 defines a distinct Vitali set.4 
 Since the collection of Vitali sets Vit(r) partitions the full set of angles, we can effect the 
extension envisaged by setting extend(r) = Vit(r), for all 0 ≤ r < 1. A key property of the Vitali 
sets is that, by construction, they are invariant under a rotation by any rational angle. That is, any 
Vitali set Vit(r) can be mapped to any other Vitali set Vit(s) by a rotation through the angle s-r. 
The probability distribution that governs the spins is also invariant under these rotations. If a 
subset of angles has probability p, then any subset produced by rotating that original subset by 
                                                
3 To avoid duplication with 0, 360o and 1 are excluded. 
4 For otherwise if there were two such rationals r and s such that Vit(r) = Vit(s), then the set 
would contain two distinct rationals r and s drawn from [0], contrary to the definition of a Vitali 
set. 
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any angle will also have probability p. It follows that an infinite lottery machine, operating with 
these extended outcome sets, is choosing its outcome without favor. 
 The discussion above rehearses a familiar starting point in treatments of measure theory.5 
The Vitali sets provide the standard, introductory example of outcome sets to which no 
probability measure can be assigned. For, by rotational invariance, we must assign the same 
probability to each Vitali set. Replicating the computations of (1)-(4), if we assign zero 
probability to each, then their countably infinite sum is zero, contradicting the requirement that 
the probability of the total space is unity. If we assign any probability greater than zero to each, 
then summing finitely many will be sufficient to yield a sum greater than one, once again 
contradicting the requirement that the probability of the full outcome space is unity. 
 That the Vitali sets are nonmeasurable is usually taken as a negative result, restricting the 
scope of measure theory. Here it is a positive result. It provides a path between the horns of the 
Probability assignment dilemma above. It supplies infinite lottery outcomes to which no 
probabilities need to be assigned. The dilemma no longer troubles the extended design. The 
device is still an infinite lottery machine. For its indeterministic dynamics selects without favor 
among the infinite lottery outcomes in virtue of the rotational symmetry of the dynamics. 
2.4	Inaccessible	Results	
 A problem remains for the extended design; and it is fatal. If an infinite lottery machine is 
to operate successfully, we must be able to read its result. Let us assume that we can read the 
exact angle on which the pointer halts. Then the result of the original infinite lottery machine of 
Section 2.1 can be read. However we have no way of reading the result of the infinite lottery 
machine with the extended design. For the prescription (“Choice”) above does not give us an 
explicit definition of the Vitali sets used. Rather their existence only is inferred from the 
assumption that such a choice is possible. Thus, even if infinite precision measurements tell us 
that the spinning pointer halted on the irrational angle 1/e, we cannot know which of the Vitali 
sets Vit(r) the angle 1/e is a member. Thus we cannot read the outcome of the infinite lottery 
machine with the extended design. The machine does not operate successfully. 
 The problem is grave. It is worse than the technical problem of the infinite precision 
needed if a measurement is to read the specific angle on which the pointer halts. For this angle 
                                                
5 See Rosenthal (2006, pp. 3-4), Wagon (1985, pp. 7-8). 
 7 
has a definite value. It is there to be read, if only we can figure out how to do it. The Vitali sets 
Vit(r) of the above construction are not uniquely specified. Each Vitali set contains an 
uncountable infinity of elements, each chosen from a countable infinity of angles. There are 
very, very many sets that could serve as each Vit(r). The prescriptions employed above place no 
restriction on which is implemented. Even extravagant idealizations of our powers of 
measurement are ineffective if the target of our measurement is not uniquely specified. 
 One might imagine that this lack of unique specification is a minor obstacle. Might not 
more careful attention to the construction give us explicitly defined sets extend(r)? It turns out 
that no way has been found of providing explicit definitions of nonmeasurable sets like 
extend(r). Their existence is always assumed without the provision of an explicit recipe for 
constructing them.  That the selections of Choice are possible without explicit prescription is 
widely accepted. It is one of the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, the “axiom of choice.” 
It was formulated over a century ago in Zermelo (1904) and was controversial from the outset. 
Zermelo (1908) had to mount a vigorous defense of its use. As we shall see below, the ingenuity 
of generations of mathematicians since has failed to find explicit recipes that can specify how the 
choices should be made. Theorems in set theory to be discussed below suggest but do not 
definitely prove that this failure is a necessity of the mathematics. 
 In sum, infinite lottery machines derived from the probabilistic randomizer, the spin of a 
pointer on a dial, must fail. A successful design must employ infinite lottery outcome sets that 
are probabilistically nonmeasurable, since otherwise the machine operates successfully only with 
probability zero. However, if we employ nonmeasurable outcome sets in the design, then we 
cannot read the result. The machine fails to operate successfully once again. 
3.	The	Physical	Description	
3.1	The	Specification	
 The failure of this last design of an infinite lottery machine does not derive, I contend, 
from a poor choice of the design specifics. Rather, any design for an infinite lottery machine 
based on probabilistic randomizers will fail in the same way. To arrive at this conclusion, we will 
first see a general physical description of the common features of all such lottery machines. 
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The randomizer. The machine consists of a device that is initialized in one initial state and 
then evolves according to a known physical theory (classical mechanics, quantum 
theory, etc.) to one of many possible end states, whose totality forms the randomizer 
outcome space. 
Probabilities. The stochastic properties of the time evolution of the device6 induce a 
countably additive probability measure over the randomizer outcome space. 
Infinite lottery outcomes. A countable infinity of disjoint sets of end states is designated as 
the set of outcomes comprising the possible selections of the infinite lottery machine. 
Dynamical symmetries. These are functions that map invertibly the outcome space back 
onto itself, while preserving probabilities. That is, each symmetry maps any subset of 
the outcome space for which a probability is induced by the dynamics to another subset 
of the same probability. 
Equal favoring of lottery outcomes. For any pair of infinite lottery outcomes, there is a 
dynamical symmetry that maps the first onto the second.  
Accessibility of the result. There is a unique prescription for numbering the infinite lottery 
outcomes as 1, 2, 3, … so that a definite result of the operation of the infinite lottery 
machine can be read. 
Successful operation. The operation of the machine returns a result with probability greater 
than zero. 
This description is already rich enough to realize the Probability assignment dilemma above. The 
only probability assignment that conforms with the equality of chances and the normalization to 
unity of the probability distribution, is one that assigns zero probability to each of the infinite 
lottery outcomes: 
P(1) = P(2) = P(3) = … = 0 
 Since successful operation requires that one of the infinite lottery outcomes be realized, the 
infinite lottery machine can operate successfully only with probability zero. 
                                                
6 While familiar randomizers governed by classical physics (coin tosses, die rolls, etc.) are only 
pseudo-randomizers, I accept the conclusion of Poincaré’s method of arbitrary functions, such as 
elaborated in Myrvold (2016), that these randomizers provide probabilities objective enough for 
present purposes. 
 9 
P(success) = P(1) + P(2) + P(3) + … = 0                                        (5) 
Following the escape described in Section 2.3 above, we arrive at a general result that will prove 
of central importance: 
Infinite lottery outcomes are nonmeasurable. If an infinite lottery machine derived 
from probabilistic randomizers operates successfully with greater than zero 
probability, it employs probabilistically nonmeasurable infinite lottery outcomes. 
3.2	A	Restriction	to	Finite	Additivity	Does	Not	Help	
 The analysis here presumes countable additivity of the probability measures. It does that 
since this is the common assumption for probability measures and the one that applies to all 
familiar probabilistic randomizing machines. One might well ask whether dropping it in favor of 
mere finite additivity will allow a more appealing escape from the dilemma of Section 1 above. 
Finite additivity allows us to sum the probabilities of only finitely many disjoint outcomes to 
arrive at the probability of their disjunction. The summations (2) and (5), however, sum a 
countable infinity of such outcomes and are no longer permitted.  
 A restriction to finite additivity escapes the probability assignment dilemma of Section 2. 
We can assign zero probability to each of a countable infinity of disjoint outcomes of the lottery, 
"1", "2," "3," ... However we can still assign unit probability to their disjunction. That is, with the 
weaker finitely additive probability measure, can no longer infer that the device operates 
successfully only with zero probability. Merely finitely additive probability measures appear to 
open a place for infinite lottery machines in probability theory.7 De Finetti (1972, §5.17) used 
this fact to motivate a restriction to finite additivity. A further appeal of finitely additive 
measures is that every outcome in them can be assigned a probability. There are no 
probabilistically nonmeasurable outcomes.  
 Promising as this sounds initially, a restriction to finite additivity provides no respite 
from the problems of the dilemma of Section 1. The problem is that the outcome sets associated 
with the infinite lottery outcomes "1," "2," "3," … are still not constructible. That a merely 
                                                
7 It is argued in Norton (manuscript) that this is a misleading appearance. An infinite lottery 
machine respects label independence. It precludes even finite additivity for the infinite sets of 
outcomes. 
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finitely additive measure can assign a probability to them has not expanded our capacities for 
identifying sets. These non-constructible sets remain as non-constructible as before.  
 The reasoning that led to their non-constructibility can be restored, but now using 
countably additive probability measures merely as mathematical adjuncts. This is permissible, 
since the inferences that led to non-constructibility do not require that the countably additive 
probability measure be the true measure of the stochastic dynamics of the system. 
 Consider some candidate infinite lottery machine. Its operation employs a dynamics that 
leads it to settle into some end state within a larger outcome space. The outcome space contains 
disjoint infinite lottery outcome sets  “1,” “2,” “3,” … Since the lottery machine is fair, its 
dynamics makes it equally likely that the end state is any of these infinite lottery outcomes sets. 
This is expressed as a symmetry over the outcome space: we can switch around the number 
labels on these outcomes without affecting the chances of the outcomes associated with the 
labels. By supposition, the chances are expressed by a finitely additive probability measure that 
is induced by the dynamics. Since it is induced by the dynamics, the measure shares the same 
symmetries. 
 For example, the pointer on a dial randomizer comes to rest in way that favors no part of 
the dial. Infinite lottery outcome sets associated with “m” and “n” are so chosen that none are 
favored. The symmetry that expresses this is just a rotation of all outcomes by some fixed angle. 
It is implemented by adding a rational number r modulo 1 to all the angles. That means that 
whichever outcome set is associated with some “m” can be taken to an outcome set that is 
associated with some other outcome “n” merely by a rotation. The induced probability measure 
also respects this symmetry. It follows that the probability associated with infinite lottery 
outcome “m” must equal that associated with outcome “n.” 
 Returning to the general case, the finitely additive measure must assign zero probability 
to each of the infinite lottery outcomes. We construct a new, countably additive measure from 
the finitely additive measure by eliminating just sufficient of its probability assignments that the 
remaining assignments can be consistently extended by countable addition. This elimination 
must remove the probabilities assigned to at least some of these infinite lottery outcomes. 
Otherwise the countably infinite sum of the zero probabilities of each the infinite lottery 
outcomes would be zero. That zero would contradict the non-zero probability of the outcome 
space or the subspace partitioned by the infinite lottery outcomes. But now we have concluded 
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that at least some of the infinite lottery outcomes are non-measurable in an inextendible, 
countably additive probability measure. Such outcome sets are non-constructible. 
 We can extend this reasoning from the case of some infinite lottery outcomes to all by 
employing different adjunct, countably additive measures. To do this we employ the symmetry 
transformation described above. If we have a countably additive measure that leaves infinite 
lottery outcome “m” nonmeasurable, choose a symmetry transformation that takes “m” to 
outcome “n” and apply it to the countably additive measure. The result is a countably additive 
measure in which infinite lottery outcome “n” is non-measurable and thus also non-constructible. 
 For example, in the pointer on a dial randomizer, a finitely additive measure must assign 
zero probability to each of the extend(r) outcome sets that partition the outcome space. To 
recover a countably additive measure from this finitely additive measure, we must eliminate the 
probability assignments to at least some of the sets extend(r), rendering them nonmeasurable in 
an inextendible, countably additive measure and thus non-constructible. Assume some particular 
extend(r) is nonmeasureable with respect some countably additive probability measure. What of 
another set extend(r’)? We apply a rotation by adding a rational number r’ – r (modulo 1) to the 
angles that will map the set extend(r) to the set extend(r’). This set extend(r’) will be 
nonmeasurable with respect to the rotated countably additive measure8 and so non-constructible. 
4.	An	Abstract	Description	of	the	Outcome	Spaces	
 The description of infinite lottery machines given in Section 3.1 is incomplete. It employs 
terms with vague referents. Just what is a “device”? What are its initial and end states? What is 
the scope of “known physical theory”? We need a more precise, abstract description of the 
probabilistic randomizer outcome spaces. To that end, we make the further supposition that: 
Outcome space I. The probabilistic randomizer outcome space can be represented 
mathematically as sets, sets of sets, and so on. The set elements include natural numbers, 
rational numbers, real numbers, finite or infinite sequences of them and their finite-
dimensioned Cartesian products. The outcomes that comprise the results of an infinite 
                                                
8 Briefly, if the measure assigns probability P to some set of angles S, then the measure rotated 
by t assigns the same probability P to the rotated set S = {a’| a’ = a ⊕ t and a  ∈S}. 
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lottery machine form a countable set of disjoint subsets within the probabilistic randomizer 
outcome space. 
This supposition strengthens the description of infinite lottery machines given in Section 3.1 
above in the particular aspects needed for the analysis that follow. Since the full scope of just 
which sets are included is still incompletely specified, this is the first version, labeled “I”. It will 
be made more precise shortly. 
 The adequacy of this abstract description must be supposed. The vagueness of the 
description in Section 3.1 precludes anything more. However the supposition can be motivated 
by a review given in the Appendix. It shows that each of the probabilistically based designs for 
infinite lottery machines in Norton (2018) conform with the description. All the designs 
considered that provide accessible results operate successfully only with probability zero.  
5.	Nonmeasurability	Precludes	Accessibility	
5.1	Zermelo-Fraenkel	Set	Theory	
 To proceed, we need greater clarity concerning the above abstract description of the 
outcome spaces in terms of mathematical sets. There are two, distinct questions: First, which 
structures exist?  Among these will be found the probabilistic randomizer outcomes spaces. 
Second, which structures are explicitly definable? Among these will be found infinite lottery 
outcomes that can figure in an infinite lottery machine whose results are accessible. 
 Axiomatic set theory provides a well-developed answer to both questions. The list of 
axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with choice (“ZFC”) are given by Hrbacek and Jech 
(1999, Ch. 15) as 
Existence, Extensionality, Schema of Comprehension, Pair, Union, Power Set, 
Infinity, Replacement, Foundation, Choice 
Other texts, such as (Enderton, 1977, pp. 271-72) give equivalent formulations, but with slight 
variations in terminology. The standard project is to show that the existence and properties of 
structures used in familiar mathematics can be derived within this axiomatic system. The project 
has deceptively simple beginnings. Both Hrbacek and Jech (1999, Ch.3) and Enderton (1977, 
Ch.4) begin by defining the number 0 as the empty set ∅, so that 0=∅, where the existence of 
the empty set is asserted by the first axiom, the Axiom of Existence. The remaining numbers are 
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then defined as 1 = {0}, 2 = {0, 1}, 3 = {0, 1, 2}, and so on. The natural number n+1 is defined 
as a union of sets n+1 = n ∪ {n}. The existence of the union of sets invoked at each stage is 
assured by the Axiom of Union. The project continues with the rational numbers, the real 
numbers and well beyond. We have the assurance of Hrbacek and Jech (p. 268) of a far-reaching 
success that extends to the fundamental objects of topology, algebra and functional spaces, as 
well as demonstration of the widely accepted theorems that govern them. 
5.2	Limits	to	What	is	Explicitly	Definable	
 There is a strong temptation to replace the above characterization of the randomizer 
outcome spaces with something that is much more than ample: the sets that comprise the 
outcome spaces of the probabilistic randomizers are derivable within ZFC. Tempting as it may 
seem, this characterization cannot stand. For within this outcome space we must be able to 
specify accessible infinite lottery outcomes. 
 The difficulty that this further requirement brings will not be apparent in the early stages 
of the construction of the natural numbers sketched above. The sets comprising the natural 
numbers 1, 2, 3, … are defined explicitly. The number 3 is defined explicitly as the set {0, 1, 2}. 
The axiom system is especially amenable to explicit definition through the Axiom Schema of 
Comprehension or Separation. It lets us take any property P(x) for an entity x (which will always 
be a set in axiomatic set theory) and use it to define a new set as a subset of a larger set: the 
defined set contains just those elements of the larger set that satisfy P. The possibilities for 
property P are very great. It can be anything that can be written in first order predicate logic 
using the predicates of axiomatic set theory. Is it an axiom schema, not an axiom, since each 
such property defines a new axiom. This descriptive flexibility is encouraging for efforts to 
specify the infinite lottery outcomes, for they are introduced as subsets of the larger outcome 
space of the probabilistic randomizers. For example, in the infinite lottery machine of Section 
2.1, the set of lottery outcomes was introduced as a subset of real numbers in [0,1) by the 
property P(x) = “x is a rational number.” The individual lottery outcomes were introduced by 
restricting P to specific rational numbers. 
 The trouble starts with the “C” in ZFC. It designates the Axiom of Choice. A choice 
function for some system of sets is a function that maps each set in the system to one of that 
same set’s elements. The axiom just says (Hrbacek and Jech, 1999, p. 268): 
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Axiom of Choice: Every system of sets has a choice function. 
In more informal terms, the axiom just tells us that, if we have a collection of sets, we can form a 
new set by picking one element from each of the sets. At first look, this axiom seems plausible 
and innocent. 
 The hidden peril is that the axiom does not define which is that choice function. It merely 
asserts that, whenever we have a system of sets, we can assume the existence of a choice 
function. That is what made the axiom so controversial. It means that, if we use the axiom to 
assert the existence of a lottery outcome set, we have not specified which that set is, but only that 
it exists. An assurance of existence is cold comfort if we are trying to read the result of an 
infinite lottery machine. We may be assured that the outcome is in some infinite lottery outcome 
set, but since we do not know which these sets are, we cannot know the lottery outcome. The 
danger is real. We saw in Section 2.3 above that a choice function was used to construct the 
Vitali sets. That yielded a design for an infinite lottery machine whose result was inaccessible. 
 There is no simple escape. The axioms of Zermelo-Frankel set theory excluding the 
Axiom of Choice (“ZF”) are too weak. We cannot replace the results derived from the Axiom of 
Choice by some more inventive or ingenious use of the axioms in ZF alone. Important theorems 
due to Kurt Goedel and Paul Cohen show that the Axiom of Choice is logically independent 
from the other axioms collected in ZF.9 We can add either the Axiom of Choice or its negation to 
ZF, without contradiction, as long as ZF itself is already consistent. Either choice will lead 
consistently to different sets of result. Thus, to secure all the results derived from the Axiom of 
Choice, we have to add it to the other axioms. 
 We require the infinite lottery outcomes to be accessible, so that the results of the infinite 
lottery machine can be read. Characterizing the outcome space as all structures arising in ZFC 
opens the possibility that the infinite lottery outcomes of interest to us are not explicitly defined 
and thus inaccessible. The risk is quite real. The Vitali sets of Section 2.3 can be introduced in 
ZFC, yet all efforts to provide explicit definitions for them have failed. On the expectation that 
                                                
9 See Hrbacek and Jech, 1999, p. 269. The literature on the axiom of choice is enormous. For 
more, see Jech (1973).  The axiom’s status remains troubled in part for its essential role in 
counterintuitive constructions such as used in the Banach-Tarski “paradox.” 
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failures like this will persist, we have to narrow the characterization of the randomizer outcomes 
spaces: 
Outcome space II. The sets that comprise the probabilistic randomizer outcome space and 
the infinite lottery outcomes are derivable within ZF. 
The scope of sets so definable is expansive. The Axiom Schema of Comprehension allow us to 
separate out sets by means of any set theoretic predicate, definable in first order logic. 
5.3	Limits	to	Measurable	Sets	
 The restriction to ZF alone may not seem so harmful. The damage becomes apparent 
when we consider nonmeasurable sets. We saw above in Section 3.1 that a successfully operating 
infinite lottery machine must employ infinite lottery outcomes that are nonmeasurable. Yet 
nonmeasurable sets cannot be derived within ZF. 
 This impossibility is a hard won realization of set theory. When set theory goes beyond 
ZF with the axiom of choice, it brings with it the possibility of nonmeasurable sets. That in turn 
enabled unexpected geometrical constructions, such as the Banach-Tarksi “paradox” or, better, 
the Banach-Tarski theorem, since there is no real paradox, just an odd result. Using as parts 
nonmeasurable sets authorized by the Axiom of Choice, it is possible to take a sphere in three 
dimensional Euclidean space, decompose it into five parts and then reassemble them into two 
spheres, each of the same size as the first.10 
 The weakness of the theorem is that suitable nonmeasurable sets are assumed to exist, 
under the Axiom of Choice, but are not defined explicitly. This provided a stimulus for resisting 
Banach and Tarski’s result. At the same time, it gave strong motivation to efforts to give explicit 
definitions for the nonmeasurable sets. No such efforts succeeded. That they must fail was all but 
shown by a theorem due to Solovay (1970). He showed (subject to the qualification below) that 
the proposition that all subsets of the reals are measurable could be added to ZF without 
                                                
10 The literature on Banach-Tarski is enormous. See Wagon (1985) for a thorough treatment and 
Wapner (2005) for a delightful, more popular account. Lest the theorem appear an affront to 
reason, at root it is no more bizarre that this construction. Take a countable infinity of marbles, 
numbered, 1, 2, 3, 4, … Divide them into the even and odd numbered sets, 2, 4, 6, 8, … and 1, 3, 
5, 7, … Renumber the even set as 1, 2, 3, 4, … and the odd set as 1, 2, 3, 4, … We have now 
duplicated the original set of marbles. 
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contradiction, as long as ZF itself is consistent. Thus it is not possible to derive a proposition in 
ZF that asserts: “This subset S of real numbers is nonmeasurable.” For that would contradict 
Solovay’s added proposition. 
 Solovay’s theorem “all but” shows the impossibility since there are loopholes. First, one 
of its premises is that there exists an uncountable, inaccessible cardinal number. Its existence is 
generally expected, but no proof of it is possible.11 Second, even if the Axiom of Choice is 
needed in the larger logical system in which nonmeasurable sets arise, Solovay’s result does not 
rule out the possibility that the strengthened system allows explicit definition of some 
nonmeasurable sets. 
  Much more can be said on these issues. For a review, see Wagon (1985, Ch. 13). What 
we have seen so far, however, is sufficient for present purposes. I will proceed with the 
presumption that nonmeasurable sets cannot be constructed in ZF and that the expansion to ZFC 
will not provide for nonmeasurable sets that are explicitly definable. Both these presumptions 
might be false, but their falsity would be surprising. 
5.4	Accessibility	and	Measurability	
 We can now assemble the results of the set theoretic analysis. If an infinite lottery 
machine, based on a probabilistic randomizer, is to yield an accessible result, we must restrict 
our outcome space, abstractly described, to sets that are derivable in ZF. If we impose that 
restriction, then the infinite lottery outcomes will be measurable. If the infinite lottery outcomes 
are measurable, then (from Section 3.1) the infinite lottery machine operates successfully with at 
best zero probability. 
 These last inferences give us the precise basis for the incompatibility of accessibility and 
successful operation. If the outcome of an infinite lottery machine is accessible, the machine 
cannot operate successfully with more than probability zero. If the machine operates successfully 
with more than probability zero, its result is inaccessible and cannot be read by us. 
                                                
11 The impossibility follows from Goedel’s second incompleteness theorem. (I thank an 
anonymous referee for this clarification.) 
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6.	Pruss’	Well-Ordered	Reals	Infinite	Lottery	Machine	
 A design for an infinite lottery machine by Alexander Pruss (2014) illustrates the 
incompatibility just described. Assume that we have a countable infinity of randomizers each of 
which picks a single real number in (0,1) with a uniform probability density over (0,1). We may 
use a spin of a pointer on a dial. Or each randomizer may consist of a countably infinite sequence 
of coin tosses. If we encode heads and tails as 1 and 0, the ensuing sequence, read as a binary 
fraction, identifies a real number in (0,1). For example <H, T, H, T, H, T,…> is read as 
0.10101010… which equals 2/3 in decimal notation. If the real numbers picked by randomizers 
1, 2, …., n, … are r1, r2, …, rn, …, then they form a set of real numbers in (0,1).12 We can now 
proceed with two versions of the infinite lottery machine: 
6.1	A	Design	that	Provides	an	Accessible	Result	with	Probability	Zero	
 Among this set of real numbers, {r1, r2, …, rn, …}, we choose the number that is 
arithmetically the smallest, say rN. The number N of the randomizer that picked rN is the 
outcome of the infinite lottery. 
 The complication is that most of these infinite sets of real numbers have no smallest 
element. There will be a smallest real in the set with probability zero. The pertinent outcome 
space consists of all sequences of randomizer numbers, ordered arithmetically. If that order gives 
us r101 < r3 < r24 = r7 < r47 < …, then the outcome is the sequence <101, 3, {24, 7}, 47, …>. 
The measure zero case of two randomizers, 24 and 7, picking the same real number is 
accommodated by including those outcomes as a set in the sequence. The infinite lottery 
outcome N corresponds to all those sequences whose first term is N. Since a symmetry of the 
selection of the real numbers in {r1, r2, …, rn, …} is an arbitrary permutation of the order of the 
randomizers, each of these lottery outcomes must have the same probability. Since their sum 
                                                
12 With probability zero, the pointer on a dial may return 0 and the coin tosses 0 = 0.00000… or 
1 = 0.11111… We excise these cases manually by spinning or tossing again whenever they 
occur. 
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cannot exceed unity, it follows that the probability of each infinite lottery outcome N is zero.13 
Summing, the probability that the lottery machine returns any of these as a result is also zero. 
6.2	A	Design	that	Provides	an	Inaccessible	Result	with	Probability	One	
 This last failing of the lottery machine design can be remedied if we replace the 
arithmetic ordering by a “well-ordering” on (0,1). It is a transitive, irreflexive relation on (0,1) 
such that every subset of (0,1), including (0,1) itself, has a (unique) least element. The ordinary 
arithmetic “less than” relation is not a well-ordering on (0,1), since there is no arithmetically 
smallest real number in (0,1) or in any of its open subintervals. Under this well-ordering, every 
infinite set {r1, r2, …, rn, …} of reals selected by the randomizers has a unique least member. 
 A complication is that this least real may be the outcome chosen by more than one 
randomizer, say M and N, for which rM =  rN. In this case, the outcome of the lottery is not 
unique. This confounding will only happen with probability zero. For the probability that any 
two nominated randomizers choose the same real number is zero; and there are only a countable 
infinity of pairs of randomizers. Thus, with probability one, this design of randomizer will return 
a result. 
 However, the individual infinite lottery outcomes can be seen to be nonmeasurable using 
the same argument as used in Section 2.3 for the Vitali sets. They partition the outcome space, 
setting aside the measure zero sector in which a unique lottery outcome fails to arise. Hence their 
probabilities must sum to unity. However each infinite lottery outcome must also have the same 
probability. Since there is a countable infinity of infinite lottery outcomes, neither a zero nor a 
                                                
13 More directly, partition the real number interval (0,1) into a countable infinity of subintervals, 
…, [1/8, 1/4), [1/4, 1/2), [1/2, 1). Also divide up the infinity of randomizers into a countably 
infinite set of countably infinite subsets. Match the subsets of randomizers one-one to the 
intervals. With probability one, the subset of randomizers matched to [1/2, 1) will return a real in 
that interval at least once. For they fail to do so with probability (1-1/2)∞ = 0. Continuing with 
the other intervals, there is a probability one that each interval contains a real returned by some 
randomizer. Combining, with probability one, each interval contains a real selected by a 
randomizer. In this probability one case, there is no smallest real. 
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non-zero value for the probability can lead to this unit sum. No probability can be assigned 
consistently to them. 
 If the design has probability one of success, then we should expect its result to be 
inaccessible. That is, even given a specification of the infinite set of real numbers chosen by the 
randomizers, {r1, r2, …, rn, …}, it must turn out that we are unable to ascertain just which is the 
infinite lottery outcome. This proves to be the case, since it turns out that there is no finite way to 
specify the well-ordering of (0,1) needed. Indeed, in results tracing back to Zermelo (1904), it 
turns out that the existence of a choice function of the Axiom of Choice is equivalent to the 
existence of a well-ordering of the set.14 Since a choice function is presumed to exist for (0,1) 
but cannot be displayed explicitly, the same is true of the well ordering of (0,1). Thus the 
outcome of the well-ordered reals infinite lottery machine may exist, but its value is inaccessible 
to us. 
7.	Conclusion	
 This analysis shows that the project of designing an infinite lottery machine using 
ordinary probabilistic randomizers is fraught with difficulties. However it does not impugn the 
very idea of such a machine. If “possible” means that the machine can be implemented in some 
plausible physical theory, then the quantum mechanical infinite lottery machine of Norton (2018, 
§10) suffices. Perhaps the simplest implementation of this quantum type of infinite lottery 
machine is provided by an ordinary quantum particle in a momentum eigenstate. If we treat just 
one dimension of space with coordinate x and time t, then the wave function of the particle with 
energy E and momentum p is spread over all space as 
Ψ(x, t) = exp(2πi(px – Et)/h) 
where h is Planck’s constant. Divide the possible spatial positions x into a countable infinity of 
intervals [n, n+1) of equal size, where n = … -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, … Taking the Born rule as our guide, 
                                                
14 Proof sketch: If a set is well ordered, then the least element of each subset defines a choice 
function. If there is a choice function on a set, then the value it assigns to the whole set is the first 
element in the well-ordering. The next element in the well-ordering is the value assigned to the 
set with that first element removed. And so on until the set is exhausted. 
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the chance that the particle manifests in any of these intervals is proportional to the integral of 
the norm of Ψ (x, t) over this interval: 
Chance([n,n +1]) = Ψ*(x,t)
n
n+1
∫ Ψ(x,t)dx = 1.dx = 1n
n+1
∫  
It is the same for all the intervals. If we use some scheme to number the intervals 1, 2, 3, 4, …, 
then the lottery outcome is just the number assigned to the interval in which the particle position 
manifests. Each arises with equal chance. 
 The notion of chance employed is not probabilistic. For the wave function Ψ (x, t) cannot 
be normalized and, thus, a full application of the Born rule is not possible. For an elaboration of 
the notion of chance that is applicable, see Norton (manuscript). 
Appendix:	Abstract	Descriptions	of	the	Infinite	Lottery	Outcome	
Spaces	
 Spin of a pointer on a dial. 15 The outcome space consists of the angular position at 
which the pointer halts. The physical angles from 0 to 3600 can be represented by the half open 
interval of real numbers, [0,1). There is a uniform probability distribution over this interval. The 
rational valued outcomes employed as infinite lottery outcomes are all probability zero. One of 
them arises only with probability zero. 
 The jumping flea.16 A flea jumps from cells 1 to 2 to 3 to …, choosing to make each 
jump or not according to a probabilistic formula. The schedule of jumps is accelerated so that an 
infinite number can be made in finite time. If the flea halts on cell n, then the outcome is 
represented by the sequence <1, 2, …, n>. The full outcome space consists of all finite 
sequences: <1>, <1, 2>, <1, 2, 3>, <1, 2, 3, 4>, … and the infinite sequence <1, 2, 3, …>. 
Probability zero is assigned to each of the finite sequences and probability one to the infinite 
                                                
15 The accounts given here are minimal. For further details, see Norton (2018). 
16 Both this jumping flea and random walk design fail to meet the requirement of equality of 
chances, even though their lottery outcomes are all probability zero, since the dynamical 
evolutions leading to the lottery outcomes are not related by symmetries of the dynamics. 
 21 
sequence. This last infinite sequence represents the case of the flea never halting. With 
probability one, this design fails to return a result. 
 The infinitely accelerated random walk. At each stage, a walker chooses probabilistically 
to step left (“-1”), step right (“+1”) or stay put (“0”) on an infinite road, marked off into a 
countable infinity of cells. The schedule of stages is accelerated so that infinitely many are 
completed in finite time. The probability distributions over walker position approaches arbitrarily 
closely to a uniform distribution as the number of stages grows large. If we take the outcome 
space just to consist of the final positions of the walker, as noted in Norton (2018, §8), we do not 
arrive at a well-defined space with a uniform probability measure. For almost all the motions fail 
to converge to a well-defined final position for the walker. A better choice of outcome space 
consists of all possible infinite sequences of -1, +1, 0, such as <+1, +1, 0, -1, 0, +1, …>, tracking 
the successive motions of the walker. Almost all of these sequences will correspond to a failure 
of the walker position to converge to one cell. Convergence is required since the resulting cell is 
the infinite lottery outcome. Convergence will arise only in cases of sequences with an infinite 
tail of 0’s. For example <+1, +1, +1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, ….> corresponds to a walker halting at 
two positions to the right of the start. Each of these convergent sequences is a probability zero 
outcome. Since there is only a countable infinity of them,17 there is a probability zero that any 
arises and, a fortiori, a probability zero that the infinite lottery machine returns any of the 
requisite infinite lottery outcomes. 
 The infinite array of coin tosses. The randomizer consists of an infinity of coin toss 
outcomes, arranged in one quadrant of a two dimensional array. Representing heads by “1” and 
tails by “0”, the outcome space consists of infinite two dimensional arrays of 1 and 0. The 
infinite lottery outcomes are encoded in rows with particular configurations. The outcome n is 
encoded in a row whose first n elements are 1 and all of whose remaining elements are 0. Thus 
the row <1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, …> encodes the lottery outcome 5. The outcome provided by 
the lottery machine is the number encoded in the first row of the array that encodes a number. 
Once the correction of Norton and Pruss (2018) is accommodated, there is a probability of zero 
                                                
17 Proof: each convergent sequence has a finite initial sequence of +1, -1 and 0. Taking them as 
the digits of a base 3 ternary arithmetic and reading the initial sequence in reverse, each 
convergent sequence can be encoded by a unique natural number. 
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that there is such a row in the array, so that the machine operates successfully only with 
probability zero. For the probability that any nominated row encodes some fixed number is zero. 
Since there is a countable infinity of possible numbers to be encoded, there is a probability zero 
that some nominated row encodes any number. Finally, since there is a countable infinity of 
rows, there is a probability zero that any of them encode a number.18 
 Hansen’s reversed supertask. An urn initially contains a countable infinity of numbered 
balls. In a reversed supertask, actions are undertaken at times …, 1/n, …, 1/4, 1/3, 1/2. At time 
1/n, an urn that contains exactly n+1 balls arrives. One ball is chosen with equal probability and 
removed, so that an urn with only n balls is passed on to time 1/(n-1). At time 1, there is only one 
ball left in the urn and it has been chosen by a process that favors all balls equally. In spite of its 
ingenuity, this design is not successful since, as described in Norton (2018, §9), it fails to specify 
a way for the process to start at time 0 so that the urn at any time 1/n can pass on an urn 
containing just n balls. However its outcome space still conforms with the above description. If 
we write Sn for the n membered set of numbers of the n balls passed on at time 1/n, then the 
abstract description of the outcome space consists of all possible infinite sequences of sets of 
natural numbers <…, Sn, Sn-1, …, S3, S2, S1>, such that …⊃ Sn ⊃ Sn-1 ⊃ … ⊃ S3 ⊃ S2 ⊃ S1. 
 If this is the total space, there is no well-defined probability measure over it that 
conforms with the design specification. The specification only provides conditional probabilities 
connecting successive stages. For example, for any specific outcome “k”, that is, that S1 = {k}, 
for k any nominated natural number, we must have the conditional probability 
P(S1 = {k} | k  ∈ Sn)   =   1/n 
since the dynamics of ball removal does not favor any ball. These conditional probabilities 
cannot be combined into an unconditional probability measure. For such an unconditional 
probability measure over the whole space, if it exists, would satisfy 
P(S1 = {k}) = Σ P(S1 = {k} | k  ∈ Sn) x P(k  ∈ Sn) =  1/n Σ  P(k  ∈ Sn) 
                                                
18 There is a probability one that first row encodes no number; and so on for the rest of the rows. 
Therefore the probability that none the rows encode a number is the product of infinitely many of 
these unit probabilities, which is one. 
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where the summation extends over all n-member sets Sn containing k. Since the summed 
probabilities in this formula must be less than or equal to one, it follows that P(S1 = {k})  ≤ 1/n. 
Since there are infinitely many stages, n can be set as large as we like, so that P(S1 = {k}) = 0. 
Since there are only countably many k and one of them must be realized, these probabilities 
P(S1 = {k}) must sum to unity if the unconditional probability measure is to normalize. However 
since all P(S1 = {k}) equal zero, they sum to zero.19 
 This failure is not the same as the nonmeasurable character of the Vitali sets. For in the 
latter case there is a probability measure over the entire space in which the Vitali sets are subsets. 
In the present case, what does not exist is the probability measure over the entire space.  
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